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INTRODUCATION
This report presents the results of a project conducted for the
Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, U.S. Forest Service.
This study entitled "Natural Resource valuation - the conceptual and
operational basis for economic analysis in a mUltiple use context" had
two objectives:
1)

To develop concepts and procedures for determining comparable values of natural resources used in production of
goods and services that move through markets. Comparability
must be in terms of (a) theoretical framework and (b) stage
of production and distribution process.

2)

To develop concepts and procedures for determining comparable
values of natural resources used in production of goods and
services that do not move through markets. Comparability
must be in terms of (a) theoretical framework and (b) stage
of production and distribution process.

While conducting this study we operated on several assumptions
basic to the analysis.

(1)

The decision-making agencies represent

society's desire to produce goods and services on public resourcess-the supply side.

(2)

The users represent society's desire to consume

goods and services produced on public resources--the demand side.

(3)

Apparent historical deviations from the above stated assumptions are
short-run aberrations resulting from grossly imperfect knowledge about
the physical and economic relations that exist among public resource
users and uses.

(4)

Economics can do two things for those making

decisions about how public resources will be used:

(a)

allocation that will maximize economic benefits and (b)

determine the
determine

economic costs resulting from deviations from the max:i.".:ni zing solution.

GENERAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ALLOCATION DECISIONS
FOR FOREST LANDS
Investments in various forest management alternatives have characteristically been made with little attention to refined economic analysis of the
returns from different projects.

This is particularly true of forest

management investments on public lands.
Several reasons can be cited why little concern has been given previously
to determining investment priorities by public forest management agencies.
First, most public resource management has been on a rather extensive basis
requiring little new investment.

For example, improvement of existing

forest stands was usually done in conjunction with timber sales.

The small

net investment associated with this type of management was the opportunity
cost resulting from adjusting cutting practices to improve residual stands
or aid regeneration rather than obtaining maximum immediate return.

Secondly,

the investments in management that did occur were dictated by policy originating from 'considerations other than economic.

Fire control, insect and

disease control, and planting were performed because they were thought good
conservation measures, not necessarily because they were sound investments.

l

Also competition within forest administration agencies for funds for nontimber uses was not as keen as it is today.

Now timber growing must compete

with many other uses of the forest and for investment funds which must be
shared with these other uses.

1

~a1ey,

Ross Samuel. 1968.
Investments in Michigan.
Michigan.

Economic Guidelines
Ph.D. Dissertation,

fo }~

!imber Management
of

T~:", 1:T.~l iversity

-2Changes within the economic environment within which decisions must be
made have increased the importance of carefully weighing investment choices.
As management becomes more intensive, each additional practice yields a
lower marginal net return, and the difference in rates of return between
alternatives is likely to become less obvious from cursory examination.
Public investment decisions based on rules-of-thumb or informal analysis
are no longer adequate.
Resource Allocation in the Competitive Market
A central concept of economics in the capitalisitc world is that the
price system, operating through the market place, balances supply and demand
and most efficiently allocates scarce resources among competing uses.

This

results from a series of relationships between producers and consumers.
These relationships are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 simply illustrates that in the conceptual market relationships,
firms operate to maximize profits.

They do this by certain behavior in the

market for the factors of production and in the market for the products they
produce.

Similarly consumers enter the goods market and make decisions

about the purchase of goods and enter the factors market and sell their own
resources.

These decisions are made so as to maximize their well-off-ness

or utility_
Figure 2 illustrates in a little more detail the b ~havior ~l1hich will
accomplish the goals of producers and consumers.

It

course, that the simplified system illustrated in

th ~

i.;!

r ecognized, of

_": ~}

figures only

gives an optimum allocation of resources if certain '.:. . " ,~ \~ :lOUS conditions
are met.

It is also recognized tha t the goal of pro f ,

raaximization can be

-3questioned.
give (1)

Yet despite these considerations this simplified model does

a first approximation of the resource allocation process in the

market and (2) some insight into the nature of price determination and the
relationship between "price" and "value."

That is, price is an equilibrating

point which at once represents the "value" to the consumer of the marginal
good sold and the "value" to the producer of the marginal good produced.
It is this insight into the relationship between price and value that
these diagrams are useful to our discussion of the problem of resource·
allocation or investment decision making in the public sector.

The public

land management agencies are producers that need some index of value to allow
them to make decisions.
Uniqueness of resource alloeation on public lands l
Problems of allocating resources (on public forest lands) are of
special interest because of the fact that many of the products produced have
not traditionally been sold in the market place, and thus we have no index
of value similar to that generated by the market system.

TIle goods produced

on public lands often have not been sold because of a certain "publicness u
associated with these products.
Let's first examine the "publicness" of some goods and services.

It

is recognized that the market system does not result in an optimum allocation
of resources in all instances. 2 We, as a body politic, have decided that
many natural resources fall into the category of an exception and have re-

1

Much sf the mat:erial 1m abe. introducto-ry statement was also reported .in
an article "Multiple Use Decision Making--Where Do We Go From Here?"
Submitted to the Natural Resources Journal.

2 The kinds of decisions that are most efficiently handled by either the
market system, the political system, or some central agency are not
easily delineated. This issue represents a major difference between
capitalism, socialism, and marxism.
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-6moved some decisions regarding these resources from the traditional market
system and put them under public control.
Such decisions, for public regulation or ownership of particular kinds
of resource supplies 9 need not be arbitrary.

There are criteria that may

be used to judge the legitimate "publicness H of any resource allocation decision.

These criteria are associated with the instances in which the market

system does not give the most efficient allocation of resources.

l

One of these instances occurs in conjunction with substantial third
party benefits.

That is, some goods and services such as education, defense,

mental hospitals, etc. offer benefits beyond those that accure to the direct
recipient of the service.

The market system, which expresses only the demand

of the direct beneficiaries, tends to under-estimate the values received
from such services.
In addition to the above third-party benefits, some commodities are
associated with indirect social costs.
pollution.

Choice examples are water and air

If these social costs are not or cannot be absorbed by the

producer of the good or its consumer, they may have no influence on the
price of the commodity, and they then would not be weighed by the market
system.
A third justification for public intervention in the form of either
ownership or cOP-trol of production enterprises occurs with technical mono2
polies.
Postal service, telephone service, and transportation are classiI

For a detailed discussion of the appropriate role of the public
sector the reader should see Edmund S. Phelps (Ed.) Private Wants
and Public Needs. W. W. Worton & Company Inc.; particularly Walter
w. Heller's article, "Reflections on Public Expenditure Theory."
2

See l1ilton Friedman, "The Role of Government in a Free Society," in
Phelps, Private Wants and Public Needs.

-7fied by some economists as technological monopolies.

In a technological

monopoly, government may have to subsidize production of the commodity to

1

insure a supply at a price that meets the demands of society.
Lastly, government intervention in the market system is often
considered justified on the basis of substantial differences between the
time preference of society as a whole and an individual's time preferences.
I,
~

This justification rests largely on the greater ability of government to
absorb uncertainty in investments in such things as basic research.
Elements of several of the above considerations are relevant to the

I

supply of mUltiple products from the nation's forest lands.

For example,

the conservation issue involves the consumption of limited resources over
time.

It is argued that the time preference of individuals is too limited

to adequately weigh the intertemporal value of resources, the use of which
straddles several generations.
It can also be argued that substantial third party benefits result
from the production of water and recreation on forest lands.
This paper, however, argues neither for nor against government ownership
of vast acreages of forest land.

Rather, its purpose is to point out the

resource allocation problems that result from this public ownership_

Regard-

less of which criteria best justify a public supply of forest-orien~ed goods
and services, the conclusion for investment purposes is the same.

Many of

the commodities do not command a well-established market demand.

No market-

established prices can represent the values of recreation and water investment analyses.

Despite the established markets for timber and forage in many

parts of the country, there has been little study of how closely administered

I'

-8prices of forage approximate market values, nor of how federal timber sale
appraisal procedures affect the market price of timber from either federal
lands or competing private lands.

Thus, the major problem for mUltiple-use

decision makers relative to public lands, is the lack of data that are
needed if the benefits from the production of certain commodities or, even
more complex, combinations of commodities, are to be evaluated.
products we have no measures of market value.

For some

Whenever demand for goods

and services from public resources is totally, or even partially, free to
reflect consumers' desires, any mispricing is quite apparent.

If over-

pricing exists, disuse of the resource develops; with underpricing "overuse"
may emerge.

This

process~

however, offers a decidedly imperfect substitute

for market values.
Nevertheless, some possible approaches to natural resource allocation
or investment decisions

ca.~

be proposed.

Decision Making Techniques
The most common approach to the dilemma of making decisions without
value information is to avoid the problem
doesn't require value data.

that is, use a method that

Two forms of this approach are:

1)

Establish physical production goals at least cost,

2)

Maximize physical output for a predetermined level of expenditure.

1

These two procedures have had hundreds of illustrations in "public
forestry" during the past several decades.

The forester, for example, may

have had a specific budget item for tree planting and within the limits of
his budget he tried to plant as many acres as possible.

1

As a result, the

See Webster, Henry and Perry Haggenstein, 1963, Economic Analysis of
Watershed Hanagement Decisions - What Sort of Guides for Land Hanagers"
Journal of Forestry Vol. 61 No. 9 pp. 631-634.

-9least promising acres were often planted first, because areas such as the
poorly producing mid-western sand flats offer inexpensive planting opportunities.

Thus, criteria that do not require value data may result in im-

proper investment priorities from any kind of benefit-cost standpoint.
Investment criteria that make only limited use of product values have
had some interesting recent applications.

U.S. Forest Service researchers
It

attempted to develop planning models for mUltiple use management and devised
the imaginative Resource Allocation

}~dels.

I

These models have been success-

fully used with linear programming techniques to determine least-cost solutions for prescribed multiple use goals.

The computerized linear program

solutions have allowed consideration of extremely complex problems involving

,t

many different kinds of costs and physical outputs.

,

Though these Resource Allocation Models presently offer the best solution to multiproduct output decisions on Forest Service lands, they do not
incorporate the important policy issues of what are appropriate production
goals.

And solutions to these models depend upon first setting the physical
,i

production goals.

That is, water production, timber cut, or animal unit
"

goals must be determined as inputs into the model.
determine what is the optimum output from his lands.

The land manager must
Thus, even the newest

'I

iJ
:,'
,

refinements in using cost minimization criteria for solving multiple use
I"

decisions do little to guarantee an optimum solution based on measures of
I

public welfare.
Still another way to avoid the value problem, which unfortunately has
it

been used too often, is to claim that no economically rational solution

It

,

-10-

exists.

Some would advocate that an uninformed decision in the political

arena somehow is superior to other decision making techniques.

In truth,

however, the best political solution can only be achieved with information
regarding benefits and costs.
A second possibility for solving public investment or allocation decisions is what can be called the macro-economic approach.

If a major role

of public resource utilization is economic development, in its broadest sense,
then the techniques of simply minimizing costs or maximizing differences
between benefits and cost may not be appropriate to investment decisions on
public lands.

As Kenneth Boulding states, "The great hiatus in economics •

• • is a real link between price theory of any kind and a theory of economic
development.

1

If the goal of public resource use is economic development,

why not deal with the problem more directly and look at the impacts of certain
allocation decisions on such variables as regional or national income, regional or national employment, economic stability, etc.
Though the stated goals of public land management have not explicitly
included economic development as a central issue, it is implicit in the justification of certain programs on the basis of stabilizing the livestock industry or protecting a certain locality's lumber industry.

Thus, employment

and local or regional income considerations do seem to influence public land
allocation decisions.
Little or no research has been done concerning the regional or national
economic impacts of alternative forest land uses.

Only recently has some

study been directed toward measuring and predicting the impacts of dams and

1

Boulding Kenneth E., 1963. The Uses of Price Theory in Models of
Markets. Edited by Alfred R. Oxenfeldt, New York, Columbia University Press, 371 p.

-11-

other water developments on surrounding communities.

One thing apparent from

these few studies is the extreme difficulty of accurately measuring the
regional impacts from even multimillion dollar projects.
The size of the region over which impacts are expected has considerable
influence on our ability to identify changes due to specific investments.
If the relevant region is large, for example a state, one might logically
conclude that most measures of macro-economic variables lack sufficient sensitivity to assess changes resulting from the relatively small investments
that characterize forest lands or from shifts in land use patterns.

If,

however, we are interested in measuring impacts on smaller units such as
communities, the techniques available, which include input output analysis
or economic base analysis, do not seem particularly appropriate for measuring
the economic interrelationships that exist within small rural areas.

The

strong economic dependence of the region under study on distant urban centers
tends to cloud the intraregional economic picture.
The macro-economic (or regional analysis) models for making multiple
use decisions seem to have three major shortcomings.

First, they are not

sufficiently sensitive to measure changes associated with small investments.
Second, they do not come to grips with the major policy issue of how
much should be invested in the various kinds of development that are possible on public forest lands.

At best, we can set criteria that require

maximizing the level of employment for a given budget or obtaining a given
level of employment at a minimum cost.

These use-optimization techniques

do not solve the problem of how much money should be invested in various
development or use combinations on public lands.
Third, in dealing with aggregate figures for income or employment, we
often ignore the problems of income distribution.

An apparent increase in

-12-

regional income may equate with decreased income and employment in other
regions.

Changes in land use patterns may generate interregional flows of

income or they may change the relative contributions of the public and private
sectors in supplying resources.
Considering the shortcomings 9 most economists would agree that the best
approach toward ranking alternative land uses would require some attempt to
evaluate the difference or ratios between benefits and costs.

If evaluation

of benefits in relationship to costs is thG appropriate criterion, then many
analytical models came to the fore.

Benefit-cost ratios, internal rates of

return, and joint production models equating marginal rates of substitution
between goods, are all methods that can be used to compare benefits and
costs of various investment schemes.
Though the mechanics of performing these kinds of analysis are relatively
simple, they have been little used in analyzing public investment.

The

attempts by the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation to apply these
methods could at best be called incomplete unsatisfactory efforts to compare
benefits and costs.

The dissatisfaction associated with this use stems

from the difficulty of assigning a quantitative measure to benefits derived
from non-market supplied goods and services.

In many instances two of the

most important products from water development (and likewise from forest
development) are recreation and water for domestic use.

Yet neither of these

outputs has an established market value which can be plugged into investment
analyses.

Methods that approach multiple use decisions from a profit maximi-

zing standpoint have therefore been little used because of the lack of value
figures for many of the benefits.
This lack has promoted considerable recent research on the problem of
resource values.

Most of this has dealt with problems of recreation valuation.

-13Status of Resource Valuation
Before examining the status of resource valuation, it is important to
clarify precisely what kind of value we are seeking.

l1any of the critics of

current research in resource valuation are not fully aware of the problems
of setting on a particular resource use.

Those critics seem to assume

that every good or service has an inherent value peculiar to it, and that
it is the role of the researcher to find this single unique value for
each resource use.

This concept of a single inherent value for each commodity

is false.

Every good and service has several values.

exchange.

That is, how many goods can be obtained by means of giving up or

exchanging one unit of the commodity in question.

Each has a value in

Each good or service

also has a unique value for each individual consumer.

This is the amount

that the individual's psychic welfare is improved through owning or consuming
the particular commodity.

A good has a third value that equates with its

cost of production.
The fallacy is therefore obvious in an assumption that a particular
resource has only one unique value, and that the researcher has but to gaze
into a crystal ball to find this heretofore hidden number.

Rather, deter-

mining a value for a particular recreation experience or for the domestic
consumption of water is a problem solved by arriving at an index number
(expressed in dollars) that approximates one of the above measures of value.
Therefore, the many values of a particular resource may each have a possible
application in some resource allocation model.

The only valid grounds for

criticizing a particular proxy value determined through research are:

(1)

that it is an index of a value not applicable to a particular allocation
model, or (2) that through a flaw in concept or methodology, the index is

-14not an accurate approximation of the value being estimated.

Many researchers

can and should be criticized, however, for not explicitly stating just what
kind of value they are trying to approximate.

Without this definition, it

is impossible to evaluate the prospective usefulness or accuracy of their
estimates.
Most of the research currently directed at valuing non-market supplied
resources has been devoted to putting a dollar value on recreation.
several general kinds of approaches have been applied to the problem.

To date
These

1

have included:
Expenditure Method - measures the value of recreation in terms of the
total expenditures of recreation.
Gross National Product Method - attempts to measure the contribution of
recreation to GNP.
Consumers' Surplus Method - attempts to determine the willingness of individuals to pay for various quantitites of
recreation. Instrumental in this method is
develop~ng ~ hypothetical demand curve for
recreat1on.
Cost Method - uses the cost of supplying recreational facilities as a
measure of the benefits derived therefrom.
Market Value Method - uses fees charged at private resorts as a proxy
value for the value of public-supplied facilities.
Monopoly Revenue Method - uses the estimated revenue that would be obtained by a monopolist owning the recreational
site as a measure of benefits. 3

1

For a more complete description of the various methods mentioned see
Lerner, Lionel, J., 1962, Quantitative indices of recreational values.
Economics in Outdoor Recreational Policy, Report Number II, Western Agricultural Economics Research Council, Committee on the Economics of Water
Resources Development.

2

Wennergren, E. Boyd, 1964. Valuing Non-market Priced Recreational Resources.
Land Economics, August 1964.
3

Bro~, William G., Ajmer Singh and Emery Castle~ 1964.

An Economic Evaluat on of the Oregon Salmon and Stee1head Sport Fishery. Oregon Agricultural
Experiment Station Technical Bulletin 78, September 1964.

-15Apparently, there is no dearth of ways to try to evaluate recreation.
These methods or modifications of them can be used in valuing other resource
Yet there has only been limited success when the calculated values

uses.

are inserted in resource allocation models.

Although we have made in-roads

at developing individual resource values, we have yet to develop value
systems which allow analysis of complex combinations of resources and resource uses.

Even though each of the above valuation schemes has its appro-

priate use in isolated circumstances, their application in resource allocation models must be evaluated on the bases of:
1.

their appropriateness for measuring benefits in terms of the optimization criteria of the allocation model.

2.

the comparability of all measures of value in the allocation model.
It is impossible to approach an optimum solution if cattle, timber,
recreation, and water are all measured by different indices of value.

3.

whether the value scheme is empirically quantifiable.

Where to From Here?
An orderly approach to mUltiple use decision-making requires a re-

orientation of research toward a broader approach to the development of
resource allocation and investment models.
The initial stage of this project was thus concerned with developing
values of goods from forest lands which would be comparable theoretically
and also useful in allocation models.
into two rather distinct parts:

This problem seems to be divisible

(1) the role that "demand" plays in the

value process, and (2) the role that "supply" plays in the value process.
To our knowledge, this is the first research which has attempted to
come to grips with both of these aspects of the role that valuation plays

.. 16-

in decision making.

Previous research in -valuing recreation, for example,

usually concentrated on the de_ad side of the valuation equation without
explicit consideration af the supply side of the equation.

Similarly most

of the research developing allocation models do not explicitly deal with
the valuation problem.
We hope that the following is a conceptual contribution, and we will
conclude with a description of research needs to test the models developed.

-16aDEMAND ANALYSIS FOR GOODS AND SERVICES
PRODUCED ON FOREST LANDS
Traditional demand theory characterizes the quantity of a good or
service demanded by consumers as a function of price.

Further, the law

of demand states that the amount of a good or service demanded increases
with a fall in price and diminishes with a rise in price.

Thus, the

inverse relationship between price and quantity demanded can be described
as ahown in Figure 1 where DD represents the traditional demand curve.
p

D

·D

O~-----------------------------Q
Figure 1.

A hypothetical mar~et demand curve (DD)

The negative slope of DD is due to the diminishing marginal utility of the
good or service in question.
acquires more of a commodity.

Utility per unit decreases as an individual
In the abstract demand is a static con-

-17cept.

Although only one point is observable at any given point in time,

economists act as though the whole curve were known.
In this simplified expression of demand the quantity of Good X consumed is uniquely dependent on the price of X ruling in the market.

In

order to obtain such a simple representation of quantity of Good X
demanded in a market consisting of a given group of consumers, the following assumptions must be made:
Q

= f(P, £, X, 1,

Where P

= price

Po)

of the commodity X

C - number of consumers
T

= tastes

and preferences of consumers for all goods sold in the

market
I = consumer income
Po

= prices of all other commodities

C, T, I and Po are fixed and known
From this expression of market conditions the symbolic demand function for
X can be written as x

= f(p),

where x and p are in definite units and

represent the quantity of X taken by consumers and the market price of X
respectively.

Variables x and p take on positive values only.

It is desirable at this point to go behind the market demand curve
and see how it is developed.
dual demand curves.

The market demand curve is made up of indivi-

At any given price the total quantity of X taken in

the market is nothing more than the horizontal summation of the quantities
demanded by individual consumerso

If we want to know more about the

market demand curve we must investigate t he individual demand curves.
The goods and services that an individual can purchase are limited
by his income and wealth and by prices at which goods and services are

-18made available.

Subject to these limitations the individual chooses

which goods and services to purchase.

In doing so, the individual makes

decisions which maximize his "utility", where "utility" is a common
characteristic of all goods and services.

For example, consider n consumer

goods (Xl' X2 , X ---, Xn). Let one form of the utility function of the
3
individual be U = (Xl' X2, X3 ,---, Xn). The individual having a given
income, I , can purchase goods at uniform market prices (PI' P2' p ,---,pn).
3
Purchases are made so that U has a maxtmum value subject to the conditions
expressing the fact that he must balance his budget:
XlP l + X2P2 + X P3 + --- + XnPn
3

=I

If the individual consumer is to maximize his utility function subject
to the above restraint, it can be shown mathematically (1)

by using

Lagrangian multipliers that the following result must be obtained:

+ UXn
Pn
Then the individual has allocated his income among goods, Xl. X2 ,

X3 , --- Xn, so that marginal utility per unit of income is equal among
all goods and services consumed.
The market demand curve in its simplified form represents the sum
of all individual demand curves in the market, which in turn represent
consumer choices relative to prices for some given time period.

And, as

Marshall stated:
If_ But in the long run the price which a trader or manufacturer
can afford to pay for a thing depends on the prices which consumers
pay for it, or for the things made by and of it. The ultimate
regulator of all demand is therefore consumers' demand.,,1

1

Marshal, Alfred. 1947.
London. page 92 •

Principle of Economics.

HacMiIlan and Co.

-19The Competitive Market
In a purely competitive market, supply and demand conditions determine market prices for all goods and services entering the market.
In any specific market area the consumer can buy a given product from a
number of firms.

If all firms are equally convenient and sell products

of comparable quality and if buyers 1.ncur similar amounts of non-market
costs, etc., then price is the criterion used by the consumer to make
decisions concerning income allocation.

When prices are equal and the

"ceteris paribus" assumptions hold, then the consumer is indifferent as
to where purchases are made.

However, if any of the above assumptions

are relaxed, then price becomes only one of the determinants of demand,
and the quantity of Good X demanded by the consumer from a particular
firm or all firms is now a function of price and the other variable(s)
allowed to change.

No one will travel outside a market area for the sole

purpose of buying a product he could have purchased in a closer market for
the same price.
costs.

To do so would be irrational

b~cause

of additional travel

Prices between market areas normally differ by the cost of trans-

portation and added handling costs from point of production
Let us consider traditional community markets where the consumer is
. in

several overlapping market areas (Figure 2).

First, consider the case

where acquisition costs for Consumer C are approximately equal at Stores
Mlt '2' or M3 , because C is an equal distance from all three markets.
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Three assumed markets in a traditional market situation

Price differentials properly determine the place of purchase.
price in M >M <M , the consumer would shop at Market M2 .
I 2 3

Where

Now let us con-

sider another case where Consumer C is located at varying distances from

,

,

three sources, MI , M2 and M , and sale prices are equal.
3
acquisition

co~ts

determine the place of purchase and C would shop at M •
3

The traditional demand function q
tion as q

= f(P,

In this case

= f(P}

can be restated for this situa-

Ac) where Ac is acquisition costs in addition to price.

It is evident that where consumers are located at various distances
from the market there are costs incurred in addition to price which
influence an individual's willingness to consume.
variable which affects his income allocation.

Price is but one

A more applicable variable

to analyze consumer demand for this type of market situation is user cost
(ue).

A consumer of goods and services produced on a national forest is
exactly analogous to the second case described in Figure 2.

For goods and

services produced on national forests, acquisition costs become more dominant in decision-making as distance to the product source increases.

The
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cost of using (consuming) national forest products is not just the price
at the site, which for some products is zero, but involves all costs to
consume.

Thus, the common denominator used in this paper is user cost and

is measured at the gate of the first user--the lumber mill, the rancher,
the hunter, the canal company, the hiker, etc.
User Cost Theory
The idea of user costs stem from the theory of equi-marginal value
in use principle which asserts that economic goods and services have
measurable value.
ent viewpoints.

The word "value" has often been used to express differAdam Smith said:

"The word value, it is observed, has two different meanings,
and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular
object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods
which the possession of that object conveys. The one may 1
be called 'value in use'; the other, 'value in exchange'."
Through almost universal acceptance of the value in use principle,
a product or service has value which is measured as the maximum amount
of dollars which a user will be willing to pay for that unit.
value in use is the value of the last unit consumed.

Marginal

The principle of

marginal value in use further asserts that an efficient allocation of
resources exists between users and uses when the values in use of the
marginal units are equal for each user and use.

I f marginal value i n

use of a resource is not equal between uses or between users, then
resources must be free to move from one use to another or from one user

I

Smith Adam, 1776. Wealth of Nations. Gateway Edition, Herney
Regnary Co. Chicago Illinois, 1953.

-22to another until no advantage is to be had from trading before resources
are correctly allocated.
Acceptance of the value in use principle is a stepping stone which
permits further development of the concept referred to in this paper as
user cost.

Since consumers allocate their fixed income among gODds and

services in such a way that total utility derived is at a maximum, it
appears feasible to measure value in use as total outlay of dollars
needed to consume goods and services.

In this light

~vhat

an individual

pays to consume non-market-priced goods as well as market-priced goods
is evidence of value in use.

Equating marginal value in use and user

cost is diagrammed in Figure 3.

The individual consumer will attempt to

Marginal
value in
use

"--- .
user
cost

.. ;.......

-

ue .1t-- - - - j
i

1

o

Q.

Q

Figure 3. Marginal value in use and user cost relationship
consume Qo of the product at User Cost UC.

Only restraints such as lack

~f capital or limited supply of Q will prohibit him from doing so.

User

cost includes all costs which would not have been incurred had the good
or service not been consumed.

These expenditures by the consumer are

measures of satisfaction or personal benefits derived from consumption
and are eVident from his willingness to pay.

The sum of all user costs

are total economic benefits since it includes the expenses paid by all
consumers to all other individuals providing goods and services to the
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consumer.
Society obviously benefits from expenditures made for the use of
national forest resources and if maximization of economic benefits is the
goal, then goods and services should be allocated to users so the following
function is maximized:
n
. -.- -.

\. .-,...

EB

=

L -.
i=1

where
EB

= economic

UC

= user

benefits

cost

i = various products (1, 2, 3, --- n) produced on the
national forests
Goods and services produced on national forests are heterogenous
from the standpoint of location of consumption.

Some are consumed on the

site, some are removed from the forest and used as inputs in the production of other goods or services, while others are used but never consumed.
It becomes necessary, therefore, for logical consistency in the valuation
process to establish a starting point for user cost measurement.
point we call the

U

This

gate of the first user" and it represents the point at

which costs are first incurred in the consumption of national forest
products.

The user gate for the recreationalist is his home, for the

grazer of domestic livestock it is his ranch; for the logger it is his

mill, etc.
UCT

The user cost for the sawmill could be computed as follows:

= tel

+ C2 + C + --- + Cn
3

where
UCT

= total

user cost per 1000 board feet in logs at the mill
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In Figure 4 a graphical presentation of a total user cost curve is
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shown.
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Figure 4 Hypothetical total user cost curve for a given resource
Oa, is incurred by those users nearest the site, part of which could be
a fee charge.

Thus, the total user cost curve will not indicate on output

higher than Ql unless the Mil per dollar of expenditure increases for some
or all users.

The assumption here is that users equate marginal user

costs to marginal utility derived from use of the resource.

Thus, any fee

change or any other alteration i n user costs associated with a given level

-26of resource use will shift the derived curve.

An increase in

fees~

for

example, will cause some users to leave the market and reduce the quantity
of use of resource x.

Likewise, any decrease in user 'c osts will encourage

more use of the resource.

Thes e s hifts can occur in the absence of any

shift in individual demand.
A total user cost curve permits valuation of a resource on the basis
of what users are actually paying to obtain its use -- it must be worth
at least that much.

On

National Forests where multiple products are

produced,TUC curves can be derived for each use .

Some of these resources

are associated with prescribed use levels (sustained yield, etc.).

User

cost curves can be useful aids to incremental investment decisions by
guiding investment to those uses where public expenditures per dollar
of investment is highest.

-27-

Summary
The user cost approach has many of the pitfalls that other approaches
have when used for resource evaluation and allocation purposes.

However,

it does provide a framework for analysis of resource allocation in a
multiple use setting.

User cost is not so different from the usual price

found in traditional markets and it plays the same role in the allocation
model that price normally plays.

It does have an advantage in the present

contest in that it can be determined empirically for every product or
service harvested from the national forests.

The gate of the first user

provides a consistent point to measure user costs.

At that gate all the

pressures in the economy culminate in the consumer's decision as to when,
how much, and where he will consume all goods and services available to
him.

The basic premise underlying user cost is that resources should be

evaluated on the basis of their value in use.

Thus, the theory of the

consumer in equating marginal utility per dollar spent in all directions
is basic to the user cost model as it is in traditional demand ana1ysis.
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SUPPLY ANALYSIS FOR GOODS AND SERVICES
PRODUCED ON FOREST Lfu~S
The process of making goods and services from public resources
available to the consuming public is no longer a costless one.

In some

cases the costs of supplying these goods may be quite small, consisting
of administration costs and minimal other expenses.
a hiking trail in a wilderness may be such a service.

The maintenance of
Yet~

as public

natural resources become more scarce or the demand on them increases, the
costs of supplying these goods and services are certain to increase.

As

costs of supplying resources increase they must play a critical role in
allocation and investment decisions.
In the introductory section, the point was made that the traditional
market price is simply an "equilibrating point which at once represents
the 'value' to the consumer of the marginal good purchased and the 'value'
to the producer of the marginal good produced. 1f

The importance of both

supply and demand conditions in the generation of values from a resource
system was emphasized.
of things to economists.

The Supply equal Demand condition implies a myriad
Comprehension of some of those requires a firm

understanding of the theory of supply_

In what follows the theory of supply is reviewed; the supply situation
on public lands as we see it is described; and finally a theoretical
supply model that seems appropriate to ~ pseudo-closed resource,l such as
Beaver Creek Watershed., i s suggested.
1

The term 'pseudo-closed resource system" refers to a management unit
such as. a for es t or watershed such as Beaver Creek. The assumption,
which 18 somewhat
,..
.
.
market in i
.unrea~1st1c, is that th1S management un1t serves a
to the
ts ent1rity. This allows us to aDply market type analysis
system.
•

-29Supply Theory
A simple definition of a supply function is a positively sloping
curve relating quantities offered to price.
with very little useful information.

This definition leaves one

An alternative definition is

available if the problem is approached from the producer's side of the
questions.
Conventional price theory tells us that a producing firm will supply
its output in accord with that part of its marginal cost schedule (Me)
which lies above its average variable cost curve (AVe)

1

where Me

= 6TC/6X.

This condition is illustrated by figure I.

He

$

Figure I.
This definition still leaves one with little information and a sterile
concept of supply.

What is needed is a clear definition of marginal cost.

Consider a production function with one output (Q) and two inputs
(A&B)

(1)

Q = f (A,B)

1 It .

important to recall that the definition of variable costs
depends upon the long-run short-run consideration. In this instance,
I suggest that it is a long-run we are dealing with.

1S

-30The respective marginal products of A and B ~re defined as:

MPP

(2)

=

aQ/aA

A

MPP B

=aQI

aB

From conventional price theorY9 we can then define the marginal
cost of production in equalibrium as:
He

(3)

or

MC

= PAl MPPA = PB/MPPB
= PA/aQ/aA = PB/aQ/a B

By proceeding with the above demonstration, we have clearly focused
our attention on the fact that the marginal costs and thus the supply
function of a firm are derived directly from the production function faced
by the firm.

How does this concept of supply compare to situations in

resource management?
Public Resource Supply
Ultimately, we will define the supply function of a closed resource
system such as Beaver Creek in a very rigorous manner, but first we should
examine the concepts of supply now commonly held by various groups.
concepts are illustrated in Figure II below.

.

$ .

i

I
1

I
I
I

"SH

These

-31"5" is the concept of supply most commonly held by resource managers.

This function describes the allowable cut or range allotment situation.

"s" is clearly not related to the concept of economic supply discussed

"s,. is administratively set so as

above, but has economic. implications.
t~

agree with the administrator's pre-set objectives.

Its position has

little to do with market or economic phenomenon.

"s" can more realistically

be considered a quota usually determin~d

by means of biological criteria.

Allowable cut is generally an annual

cutting recommendation based on an attempt to harvest growth plus a correction
for adjusting the timber stand in the direction of a "regulated condition."
Likewise grazing allotments

a~e

usually determined by some estimate of a

sustainable amount of forage production.

Generally,allowable cut or allow-

able grazing are quotas or biological limits which can be met with a
minimum of direct investment of funds.
These consumption limits or quotas are not affected by the cost of
producing the resource and thus appear as a vertical line.

That

is~

output

doesn't vary with the costs of production or the price of the commodity
in the market.
Supply a Function of Investment

/s, on the other hand» defines a supply function quite similar to the
concept of economic supply described above.

lve are assuming a production

function of the form
(4)

Q

where MPP
(5 )

1NV

=f

(Investment)

=aQ/aINV

Me = p

INV

laQ/aI1~

-32Critical examinat:ion of S reveals that it too is un~cceptable a~
an explanation of economic supply.

S clearly begs the confounding

problem of opportunity costs so prevalent in public resource allocation .
questions.

1

Since opportunity costs are important in resou.rce allocation
decisions, some consideration of them is vitalo

SupplY and Opportunitv Costs
Where

~8es

of a public reSource compete, production of on,e implies

non-production, at least to some degree, of others.

That is, there are

opportunity costs associated with every investment decision.

The production

function is not merely
Q1

=f

(Investment).

QI

=f

(Investment ~

It 1s more like
(6)

Q2' Q3' .•• ~).

This In tum yields a marginal cost function "lldch ic quite diffe-r.en~
from
(7)

Me :: PI/aQ/aINV

as defined above.

Clearly, we now have
(8)
1

8

total cost function of the . form:

TC - (Investment Costs) + (Opportunity)

It is informat~v
. . e t Q d·~scuss the point Q in Figure II. Q is the
1eve 1 of 8ustainabl
d
0
o
·
of with e
.;
co e pro uction the untreated biotic sy~tem i ;~ q-tpable
- ~ ro .nveutment ~ The locat i on of this obviously dep~nds · upon
the pnys~cal
n t
,.
.,.
"
note th t "s" a ure or the system considered. It is interesting to
to the ~eft 0 (the pLes~nt administered supply) could be set eiiper
ide of Q
r right of Qo • Assigning "s" a position on either
are not dO opens the door to a number of questions but since they
irectly reI evant to what follc~'7s
.
they will' not be con$>tder$~ .

-33This in turn yields us a marginal cost function for Q of the form:
1

Me =dTC/dQl =dI~~/aQI +dOPP/dQl

(9)

A Revised Supply Function
For simplicitY9 assume a two-good system in which production is
defined by a curvilinear production function embodying the assumption
of diminishing returns.

l

The for good one (Ql)'

Mel =aTC/dQI =a+eQl = Pl 6Q2
wheredINV/aQl =a+BQl
d OPPC/d Q

1

= -P26Q2

2

= price of Q2
2
This then yields a supply function for Q similar to tha-t of Figure III.
P

1

-P 26Q 2 +a +SQl

$

= Me = s
1

1

.--; ....

- -<Il . .

'

------..-

- .--_.. Q

l

Figure III
1

2

Note
that the cOli
dimini
urvl. near production function and the assumption of
A
kShing returns are not essential to the discussion that follows.
mar. et equilibrium normally would still be attained without these
assumptions.
.
-

The c: term
°
Ii- P6Q 2 Wl.°11 satl.sfy
the alternative good relationships (i.e.
amp mentary, competitive, non-related).
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Implicit in this argument is the fact that for every level of Q
2
production, there corresponds a different supply function for Q1e

This

is illustrated by Figure IV.
$

Figure IV
Ec:ailibrium Value
If we add a demand function for Q to the system, a pseudo-market
1
equilibrium price is generated for each possible production level of Q2This is the conventional market analysis of price theory as demonstrated
in Figure V.

,

S
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2

=

S

1

f

(Q ) 1

2

~"~

.

.....L.------Q

1

Figure V
Since this is the variable (equilibrium price) of coneerf1, it ll7o.1d
seem that we have a possible scheme for analysis.
The Model
From the above discussion it is obvious that a complete system
WOuld consist of a production function~ a supply function, and a d~mand

-35function for each good.

This in essence is

th~ basi ~

for t .h e _.supplY

model.
For simplicity we ag::lin assume a two-good system.

We further will

assume that all the inputs (Ai) of the production function
Q == f
i

(A ,
L

1.2 ' •• • , An ' Q~,) k f.

i

can be grouped into one variable called Investment. (INV).
This system can then be defined by a set of eight

(8) · s~D1ult411~O~S

a production function, e supply function, a demald

equations:

fu~ction,

plus a supply-equal-demand identtty for each good.
Symbolically these equations are :
(II)

Qi

=f

(12)

QP

::

(13)

Qd = f
1

(P 1)

(14)

Qd2

=f

(P2)

(15)

QS

= f

(P , Q~)
L

(16)

QS

= f

(F , QP)

(17)

QS

= Qd

(18)

QS ::: Qd

2

1

2

1

(INV , Q~)
I
f (INV , QP)
1
2

2

1

1

2

2

where

QP

;::

i

quantity of i the good produced

OS

-1 ==

Q~~

::

H

..

"

If

Ii

Ii

supp\ i pd

"

H

H

II

demanded
.. ~. ,

pi :: price of the i th good
INVi =

var~aQle

investment costs of

i th good.

pr9ductio~

aS$oGiated with the

-36The system is characterized by eight (8) endogenous variables:

Which is consistent with the eight equations defined.
Conclusions
This system would generate the equilibrium values of the several
products.

The main thrust of the system is an attempt to approximate

a market supply function which is vital to the allocation model we are
hypothesizing.
The supply function generated by the system will be more complete
than past attempts in that it not only considers the variable costs of
production but also the opportunity costs so prevalent in public resource
management decisions.
The model presented seems to be theoretically sound.
generate an efficient allocation of resources at the
case hypothesized,at the market level.

It will

~and

in the

Of course, there is the ever

present question concerning violation of the perfect competition
assumption.

Obviously the worth of the model will depend to some degree

on the extent of violence done to this often attacked assumption.
DepeDriing upon one's !"e 'luirements for the definition of a competitive

market, t 1-!e assumption will nor- or will be a e c2;n:c?b l.e.
the

tex~

If one insists on

book list of criteria (many fi nltB., :.:. . ._:,. .. ·1.;1..".,ers, etc.) the

assumption will rarely b-e accepted.

If,- on

thf: .; .'

4.=: _

hand, one is

-37interested in the effective results of the market process (MC of

~roduction

marginal value in use), the assumption will be acceptable in many cases.
Further discussion of this point is not warranted in this paper, since
justification or negation of this approach to analysis of market structure
rapidly degenerates into parroting of one's educated biases.
Even if one

grant~

the empirical validity of the proposed model,

the empirical infeasibility of the system should be a sufficient block
buster to satify critics.
The production function is obviously the central building block of
the system, and the absence of mUltiple input-output models from the
empirical horizon is evidence of the problem.

Adequate data for such an

involved estimation procedure is just not available.
input two output model suggested.
variables.

Consider the multiple

The system defined eight endogenous

Couple this with a minimum of twenty or thirty exogenous

variables and the problem becomes obvious.

To obtain any significant

silmultaneous estimation of the system's parameters would reguire
fifty to one hundred observations in all probability.

Anyone acquainted

with the data available for natural resource systems will recognize the
almost insurmountable task of acquiring a number of observations even
approaching this.
The question of existence of stable production functions may also
be raised.

Some imply that even if all the data needed were available,

the functions could not be estimated.
Conclusion.

This seems to be an unfounded

In a world where cause and effect are accepted by most,

the complexity of the function.s~ not their existence:op would seem to be
the problem or point of debate.

=

-33This implies that with a fully specified model and adequate data, the
function could be estimated.

In the case of some human

behavior~

the

functions may be so complex as to render them practically useless.
Production functions on the other hand do not seem to warrant the same
conclusion.

The problem, therefore, would seem to be data alone.

At any rate, in the context of the proposed model, the apparent
inavailability of appropriate production functions forces us to retreat
to the ttaditional concept of natural resource supply (i.e. administratively
set supply "s" of Figure II).
t~lat

does this imply for the proposed model?

of significant proportion.

It implies questions

The basis of support for the proposed model

was implicitely traditional efficiency criteria.

That is, marginal costs

in production should equal rnargj.nal value in use.

Since ItS" involves no

consideration of the costs of production

the efficiency

directly~

conditions will not be defined by the model unless it is by chance.
leaves us on very unsure footing.

This

TIle only conclusion possible is that

the supply curve will intersect the user cost curve some where.
meaning of thiS point is unclear from a welfare point of view.
however, define a price or value index of some sort.

The
It

does~

The possibility

exists that a "politically" or "administratively" determined inelastic
supply curve in addition to considering marginal costs of production also
considers social opportunity costs and thus is a closer approximation of
a "public supply curve".

-39NEEDED RESEARCH
The model proposed incroporates concepts not currently used in
forest service decision making.
bits and pieces.

Thus, data are available only in

Yet, there may well be more data available than commonly

thought.
Data Needs-Supply
Ideally, estimates of single use production functions for any site
being studies are needed.

Also derived estimates of input substitution

relations among all uses as well as product substitution relations among
all uses are necessary.
benefits and

costs~

With these physical functions, the associated

and a computer program, testing the model is possible.

Obviously, the ideal is far from a reality and will be for some time.

Still,

most decisions in life are based upon something less than perfect information.

The use of a rational technique and limited data produces rational

decisions.

Even though the error may be large, it will normally be smaller

than it would be if based on an irrational technique.
Generally, physical relationships such as production or substitution
functions are curvilinear in the range where economics enters the decisionmaking process.

Linear relations are the exception rather than the rule,

and it is doubtful if there are many linear cases among the uses made of
public forest lands.

Of course, it would be desirable to have data over

the whole range of each functi0 n.

Though these data are not currently

av a~°1 a b Ie, if we can find poi:"'~. q a;:\d specify an appropriate mathematical

fUnction, some of these econo!l!.'~;:. relationships can be estimated.

The

Forest Service and State Experi n'. ent Stations have some points established

-40from which a supply function can be synthesized for several uses and
several sites.

Physical data will be relatively more difficult to generate

than the cost data related to supply extending or shifting.
Data Needs-Demand
The demand function (UC) for each use for a given site will have to
be estimated from data obtained from the society of users.

Samples,

survey questionnaires, and on-site checks as well as secondary sources
will need to be employed.

Since we are concerned with a synthesized test

of the model at this time, a relatively small user area would be selected
in order to minimize the costs of obtaining data .
Estimates of a UC function for each use for a given area can be made
with considerably more confidence than can estimates of supply costs
because more pOints along the s i gnificant range in the functions can be
determined.

Also, there is already considerable experience in estimating

these functions for some uses.
Identifying the Restrictions
The allocation decision depends not only upon UC and supply costs,
but also upon physical and institutional limitations.
is the allowable harvest limit on the supply side.

A major limitation

For most traditional

uses administ r ative decisi.ons , budget restrictions, experience, and
research have established it .
HakinL _·:. :1t:: System Operational
Finding the data neede,).
the analytical syst em

t ~: ::

-:.S

only par t of the testing problem.

r. Fi l l

be~ t

Se1ect-

accommodate t h e data , provide the

-41maximizing allocation solution, and be practical for field use is equally
difficult.

Obviously, computers will have to be employed to handle the

many inputs required by the allocation problem.

Alternative systems need

to be tried in the testing stage and the results of each need to be studied
in relation to the logic of the model $
Application to field problems will vary in complexity; some sites
will have all use possibilities; some will serve people from allover the
country; and some will accommodate many techniques for producing the
product or service.
program

usin ~ a

a local

~ommunity,

Such a complex problem may require a national study

large computer.

i

A site with only one or two uses, serving
~ ,

and having only one or two ways of doing the job might
>};

-

be studied by a qualified man with a program and a calculator.

Data for

intermediate problems could be sent to a regional computer center for
analysis.
Programs for computers and selection of the analytical techniques to
satisfy the requirements of the model need to be specified and tested
during the research program.

We argue that such activities are part of

the research process and in the end will save time and money and help
standardize the decision-making processes.
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